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ABSTRACT Pollution-monitoring systems (PMSs) are used worldwide to sense environmental changes,
such as air quality conditions or temperature increases, and tomonitor compliancewith regulations. However,
organizations manage the environmental data collected by such PMSs in a centralized manner, which
is why recorded environmental data are vulnerable to manipulation. Moreover, the analysis of pollution
data often lacks transparency to outsiders, which may lead to wrong decisions regarding environmental
regulations. To address these challenges, we propose a software design for PMSs based on distributed
ledger technology (DLT) and the long-range (LoRa) protocol for flexible, transparent, and energy-efficient
environment monitoring and data management. To design the PMS, we conducted a comprehensive require-
ments analysis for PMSs.We benchmarked different consensus mechanisms (e.g., BFT-SMaRt and Raft) and
digital signature schemes (e.g., ECDSA and EdDSA) to adequately design the PMS and fulfill the identified
requirements. On this basis, we designed and implemented a prototype PMS and evaluated it in the field. The
evaluation shows the effectiveness of DLT-based PMSs that include portable low-energy sensor nodes and
demonstrates the applicability of the proposed software design for PMSs in contexts other than air pollution.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, distributed ledger technology (DLT), Internet of Things (IoT), LoRa, low-
energy sensors, pollution monitoring systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The implementation of ever stricter environmental protection
regulations over the past decade has increased the demand
for reliable pollution data (e.g., particle pollution in the
air) to support researchers, policy makers, and planners to
make informed decisions on managing and improving the
living atmosphere [1], [2]. To collect and store pollution
data and allow for detailed analyses of environmental con-
ditions (e.g., air quality), reliable pollution monitoring sys-
tems (PMSs) are required [3], [4]. Currently, local authorities
(e.g., public environmental agencies) are given much of the
responsibility to operate PMSs and carry out the provision
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Wei Quan.
of clean air, including monitoring air pollution and devel-
oping strategies to reduce air pollution [5]. Centralizing the
responsibility of operating and maintaining PMSs in local
authorities, however, caused a lack of transparency regarding
the collecting, processing, and storage of sensor data (e.g., in
terms of authenticity, integrity, and nonrepudiation) [6]. Con-
sequently, the validation of pollution analyses is challenging
for external parties because only few analysts ultimately
perform data cleaning, calibration, applied analytical meth-
ods, and sensor data interpretation [7], [8], which can lead
to incorrect assessments of environmental pollution [9] and
mislead public regulation decisions and thus cause threats
to human health. To counter such misguided regulations by
enabling cross-validation by third parties [10] and to support
better decision making regarding measures to improve air
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quality [8], transparency should be increased in the collection,
storage, and analysis of pollution data [7].
Local authorities primarily use stationary PMSs and
predominantly investigate long-term effects on an urban
macro scale (e.g., climate change). The large size and high
cost of stationary PMSs (approximately 200,000 USD for
installation and approximately 30,000 USD per year for
maintenance [11]) limit the number of people who can par-
ticipate in the collection of pollution data and how people
can access stored data [8]. Moreover, the use of stationary
PMSs hampers the collection of pollution data in a flex-
ible and fine-grained way [12]. To support finer-grained
air pollution monitoring, more detailed data on the spatial
and temporal variability of air pollutants (e.g., particulate
matter) are required [8]. Fast technological advancements
regarding portable sensor nodes enable pollution sensing in
a flexible way due to their low cost, small size, and battery-
based power supply. In contrast to stationary PMSs, PMSs
integrating portable sensor nodes allow for flexible ad hoc
measurements and can achieve a high spatiotemporal resolu-
tion because such PMSs usually comprise a large number of
sensor nodes [13], [14]. Although the use of portable sensor
nodes in PMSs is promising to improve pollution monitoring,
such PMSs have downsides regarding constrained resources
of portable sensor nodes (e.g., low computational resources
and constrained energy supply because of the use of batter-
ies) [15]. These downsides make the design of PMSs using
portable sensor nodes particularly challenging. Improvement
of pollution monitoring requires a thorough analysis on how
to design viable, transparent, and fraud-resistant PMSs that
include portable sensor nodes.
Distributed ledger technology (DLT) promises to over-
come many open challenges for the operation of PMSs
(e.g., lack of data authenticity or tamper-proneness of stored
data) [16]. DLT allows operating a transparent and tamper-
resistant distributed database through a highly available
and fault-tolerant infrastructure in which various storage
and computing devices (referred to as DLT nodes) repli-
cate data [17]. Many use cases of DLT applications exist
that have successfully provided access management to data
(e.g., [18]), identity management (e.g., for individuals, orga-
nizations, or devices [19]), and tamper-resistant logging
and data storage (e.g., [20], [21]). Nonetheless, DLT is
replete with various downsides, such as low performance
compared to central and conventional distributed databases
(e.g., poor scalability [22]) and extensive resource consump-
tion (e.g., high storage requirements due to numerous ledger
replications) [17]. The high resource consumption of dis-
tributed ledgers compared to conventional systems [23] is
a particular challenge for the design of PMSs that employ
portable, low-energy sensor nodes. At first glance, the down-
sides of DLT are particularly at odds with the core strengths
of PMSs that include portable sensor nodes (e.g., easy main-
tenance and no place-boundness) [24] and call into question
the effective use of DLT for PMSs using portable sensor
nodes.
Since research on the applicability of DLT in the context
of PMSs using portable low-energy sensor nodes is still in
its infancy, little is known about the effectiveness of DLT
in the context of PMSs incorporating portable low-energy
sensor nodes and the appropriate resolution of the trade-
off between flexibility and resource consumption. Thus,
to combine the advantages of DLT and PMSs with low-
cost portable sensor nodes and increase data authenticity and
reliability of PMSs, we aim to answer the following research
question:
RQ: How to design reliable PMSs that incorporate DLT
and portable low-energy devices?
To answer our research question, we carried out an
extensive requirements analysis for PMSs with low-energy
sensor nodes and DLT by conducting a comprehensive
literature review. Based on the derived requirements cat-
alog, we designed and implemented a DLT-based PMS
prototype1 that uses low-energy sensors. To appropriately
dimension the prototypical PMS, we benchmarked dif-
ferent signature algorithms (e.g., ECDSA and EdDSA)
against different consensus mechanisms (e.g., BFT-SMaRt
and Raft). To show that our prototypical PMS meets the
requirements for PMSs (e.g., accuracy, low-energy con-
sumption, and reliable data transmission), we conducted
a field test over a 24-h period. Finally, we discussed
to what extent the proposed PMS fulfills the identified
requirements.
Our work presents essential requirements for components
of PMSs (e.g., energy consumption of digital signature algo-
rithms), which help to design effective PMSs and enable
a better evaluation of conceptual and implemented PMS
designs. Our detailed discussion and evaluation of alterna-
tive implementations (e.g., different consensus mechanisms)
serves as a guide for the design of PMSs and similar Inter-
net of Things (IoT) systems using low-energy devices and
provides actionable insights into potential advantages and
disadvantages of alternative system designs prior to imple-
mentation. Moreover, we show an overall concept on how
a distributed ledger can be employed as IoT integration
middleware in an entirely decentralized way. Therefore, our
work addresses extant challenges regarding environmental
data collection using portable sensor nodes, while promoting
data authenticity, data availability, and tamper-resistance in
PMSs.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. First,
we present the requirements for PMSs that we derived from
scientific literature. Second, we describe the concept, design,
and implementation of the proposed PMS. Third, we present
and discuss the results of our evaluation efforts. Fourth,
we compare the proposed PMS with extant approaches from
the literature. The manuscript concludes with a discussion
and an outlook for future research in the field of PMSs using
portable sensor nodes and DLT.
1see https://github.com/lopess-project
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II. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS FOR THE DESIGN OF
POLLUTION MONITORING SYSTEMS
To identify requirements for PMSs incorporating portable
low-energy sensor nodes and DLT, we conducted a literature
review including extant scientific documents (e.g., journal
articles and conference papers). We focused on scientific
documents that reveal best-practices, goals, and challenges in
the design of PMSs incorporating portable sensor nodes. This
knowledge formed our foundation for deriving functional and
nonfunctional requirements for PMSs to be considered in this
work.
For the literature search, we followed established
approaches [25], [26]. First, we developed and refined a
search string focusing on the scientific investigation of the
interplay of wireless sensor networks (WSN), low-power
wide area networks (LPWAN), sensors nodes, and DLT.
We applied the search string (WSN*ORLPWAN*OR sensor*
OR network*) AND (blockchain* OR ‘‘distributed ledger
technology*’’) to scientific databases we deemed relevant
for requirements analysis: ACM DigitalLibrary, EBSCO-
host, IEEEXplore, ProQuest, and ScienceDirect. The search
revealed 217 documents in total (i.e., articles and papers).
After screening the title, abstract, and keywords of each
document, we excluded duplicates (46) and documents
unrelated to our topic (155) and produced a preliminary set
of 16 potentially relevant documents. We deemed a document
relevant if it met the criteria of a peer-reviewed scientific
paper or article that was written in English and described the
implementation of a PMS. We carefully assessed the rele-
vance of these documents by reading through their full texts
and finally selected 14 documents relevant to the require-
ments analysis. Subsequently, we analyzed the remaining
documents to identify requirements for PMSs by performing
open coding and axial coding of the relevant literature [27].
First, we extracted goals and requirements discussed in the
documents and noted the requirements’ names and descrip-
tions (open coding). For example, if authors strove for a
high degree of provable data integrity by applying digital
signatures, we extracted a requirement for high integrity.
If mentioned, we also coded reasons and consequences for
the requirements (axial coding), which helped us to aggregate
similar requirements across articles. For example, we merged
the requirements integrity [28] and immutability [29] into the
requirement for integrity [30].
From a functional perspective, PMSs should collect and
record data from (outdoor) sensor nodes (e.g., [31], [32]).
We define a sensor node as a device composed of at least one
sensor, a microcontroller, and other peripherals such as a GPS
receiver (cf. Section IV-A). Only data of authorized sensor
nodes should be stored by the PMS, which is why the PMS
should allow for the registration and unregistration of sensor
nodes (e.g., [33]). To do so, the PMS should integrate identity
management for sensor nodes and consortium members who
own these sensor nodes (e.g., [34]). The registration of new
sensor nodes should be confirmed by all consortiummembers
operating the PMS. Furthermore, the PMS should allow the
public to retrieve recorded sensor data [35], for example, via
a browser application [30]. For all recorded sensor data, the
assigned organization for the sensor node should be visible
to allow for transparency regarding the owner and operator
of the respective sensor node [36]. Therefore, all consortium
members should prove their identity before they are allowed
to join the consortium running the PMS [33].
We identified thirteen nonfunctional requirements that a
decentralized PMS incorporating portable sensor nodes needs
to fulfill. Table 1 summarizes related nonfunctional quality
characteristics for PMSs based on low-energy sensor nodes
and DLT.
FIGURE 1. Schematic overview of the PMS architecture.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF THE POLLUTION MONITORING
SYSTEM WITH PORTABLE SENSOR NODES
The architecture of our PMS comprises a consortium of
organizations (e.g., research institutions, private contributors)
that operate and use the PMS and four classes of technical
components: sensor nodes, gateways, a public key infras-
tructure (PKI), and a distribution ledger (cf. Figure 1). Each
consortium member must register with the PKI of the PMS.
Registered consortium members are allowed to register their
sensor nodes with the PKI of the PMS to enable a transparent
management of sensor nodes’ identities and to achieve data
integrity and nonrepudiation [42], [43]. After registering the
sensor nodes, each consortiummember can position their reg-
istered sensor nodes (e.g., in urban areas) and gather sensor
data over a certain period in specific measurement intervals.
At the end of each measurement interval, the sensor nodes
digitally sign the collected data and broadcast the sensor mes-
sage over a wireless network to surrounding gateways. The
gateways forward the sensor message to the DLT nodes of the
distributed ledger. On the DLT nodes, the digital signature of
the sensor message is validated by a smart contract, which is a
program running on the distributed ledger [17]. If the digital
signature is found to be valid, the sensor message is stored
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TABLE 1. Nonfunctional requirements for PMSs.
on the distributed ledger. All sensor messages are stored
once and duplicates are discarded. Consortium members can
access the stored sensor data directly via their DLT nodes.
Additionally, each consortium member hosts an application
programming interface (API) for the public to access stored
sensor data (e.g., via a browser application).
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLLUTION
MONITORING SYSTEM
Due to complex dependencies between PMS components
(e.g., network bandwidth and throughput of the distributed
ledger), it is necessary to implement the conceptual PMS
and test it directly in realistic conditions in order to evaluate
its fulfillment of the identified requirements presented in
Section II. For the implementation of the proposed PMS
concept (cf. Section III), we used customized, battery pow-
ered sensor nodes, the open LoRa protocol, standard dual-
channel gateways, a distributed ledger, and digital signatures.
To adequately dimension the PMS, we considered extant
recommendations for pollution measurement intervals and
the required coverage of the measurements (e.g., [44]), which
form a focal base for the calculations regarding, for example,
the required bandwidth and throughput.
A. SENSOR NODE
Sensor nodes comprise four components: onemicrocontroller
unit (MCU) with its related hardware security capabilities
for private key storage, at least one sensor, one GPS module,
and one LPWAN chip. The core of each sensor node is a low-
cost ESP32 MCU [45] because of its minimalist design and
low power consumption compared to other low-cost single-
board computers (e.g., Raspberry Pi Zero) [46]. The MCU
starts each measurement in a predefined order by retriev-
ing data from the particulate matter sensor (Nova SDS011)
and the humidity and temperature sensor (Grove DHT22;
cf. Appendix B). Afterwards, the MCU retrieves its location
and the recent timestamp using the attached GPS module
(Ublox Neo-6M). Subsequently, the MCU digitally signs
recorded sensor data using its private key, which is stored in
encrypted storage (eFuse). The sensor nodes send the digi-
tally signed data over a long distance (up to approximately
5 km [47]) in an energy-efficient way using LPWAN technol-
ogy (cf. Section IV-B). To do so, the MCU has an integrated
LPWAN chip (Semtech LoRa transceiver SX1276), which
can be extended with an external antenna to improve its range
to up to 10 km.
The placement of sensor nodes in the public space enables
any (nonauthorized) person to easily access the senor nodes
software and hardware. Having access to the sensor node’s
on-board USB and serial peripheral interface, a person could
read its data or manipulate its firmware and thus harm authen-
ticity (e.g., by leaked private keys of sensor nodes).
To protect the sensor nodes’ private keys, we enabled
the MCUs’ flash encryption using an Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) key. Flash encryption is a feature to encrypt
the nonvolatile MCU memory storage (flash memory). The
AES key is stored on the electronic fuse (eFuse) of the MCU,
which is an one-time programmable read-only memory. Once
the eFuse of the MCU is used for key storage, it cannot be
modified again because the data are physically burned on
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the eFuse. When flash encryption is enabled, application-
based flash partitions (e.g., digital signing of measurements)
are encrypted with the AES key. From there, the decryp-
tion can only occur at runtime via the MCU itself [48].
Each sensor node can decrypt its own flash memory, while
unauthorized persons cannot access any data stored on the
MCU (e.g., the private key) [49]. Moreover, we implemented
a secure boot process to detect change of the sensor node
software (e.g., modification of sensor data). The secure boot
process cryptographically checks all software components of
the MCU to be signed and verified before executing [50].
If software components are manipulated, the sensor node will
refuse to boot [51].
B. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION
1) PROTOCOLS
LPWAN technology enables sending and receiving small
amounts of data over a range of 1 to 10 km at low power
consumption and includes three predominant protocols: NB-
LTE, Sigfox, and LoRa [52]. NB-LTE operates within a
licensed frequency band, which is why there are no restric-
tions regarding the maximum number of messages per day.
Furthermore, the licensed spectrum achieves a higher degree
of reliability and quality of service compared to Sigfox and
LoRa [53]. NB-LTE primarily establishes a random access
procedure, where each sensor node sends a sequence of sig-
nal messages to request resources of the base station. This
resource allocation procedure consumes additional energy,
shortens battery life, and reduces cost efficiency compared
to unlicensed protocols (e.g., LoRa) [54].
TABLE 2. Comparison of LPWAN protocols based on [54].
LoRa and Sigfox use unlicensed but duty-cycle-regulated
industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) bands below 1GHz,
which can transmit data over several kilometers depending on
their environment (cf. Table 2). Compared to LoRa, Sigfox
strictly limits the uplink data rate, the maximum payload
size, and the number of messages that can be sent per day.
These limitations are intended to achieve an ultralow energy
consumption, long transmission range, and increased receiver
sensitivity. For the proposed PMS, a minimum payload size
of 121 B is required (28 B sensor raw data, 29 B GPS data,
and 64 B digital signature; cf. Section IV-B3). The Sigfox
protocol limits the maximum payload size of 16 B, and is
therefore unsuitable for the proposed PMS. In contrast, LoRa
offers a maximum payload size of 243 B [55].
Since LoRa best fulfills the requirements for the PMS,
we decided to use LoRa in our own wireless net-
work (cf. Section IV-B2). We chose a predefined LoRa
configuration for applications in urban areas (spreading fac-
tor of nine; code rate of one) and a bandwidth of 250 kHz
(maximum transmission rate of 439 bit/s) because a detailed
performance analysis of LoRa networks is not within the
scope of this work [56].
To design the PMS regarding throughput and scalability
(cf. Table 1), an appropriate pollution measurement interval
must be determined. The measuring interval of the sensor
nodes to determine the air quality depends on the targeted
resolution of the air pollutionmonitoring [57] and varies from
once each minute [58] to once each hour [59]. To achieve
a sufficient and feasible temporal resolution of the sensor
data considering LoRa’s technical capabilities, we defined a
measuring interval of five minutes.
2) NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
LoRa wide area network (LoRaWAN) is an LPWAN protocol
that specifies the upper network layers of the LoRa protocol
including sensor nodes (or more general terminal devices),
gateways, network servers, and application servers [60].
LoRaWAN predominantly serves as a routing protocol for
the communication between application servers and sensor
nodes. Sensor nodes use the LoRa protocol to transmit data
to gateways. Subsequently, gateways use the standard trans-
mission control protocol (TCP) and the internet protocol (IP)
to send sensor messages to the network server to register
and authenticate the respective sensor node before forwarding
data to the target application server. By doing so, LoRaWAN
ensures that only registered devices can send data to applica-
tion servers (e.g., DLT nodes) [61].
Public network servers of a LoRaWAN (e.g., The Things
Network) are usually operated by private organizations
(e.g., ChirpStack). Public network servers have the ability
to reject legitimate data from sensor nodes. Therefore, the
use of public LoRaWANs comes with uncertainties regarding
the network operation and potential loss of data integrity
through network servers [62]. To avoid having a single orga-
nization that manages the PMS’s network communication,
we decided to set up our own dual-channel LoRa gate-
ways (Dragino LG02) for communication between the sensor
nodes and the distributed ledger. Each consortium member
can individually set up a LoRa network to enable the com-
munication between sensor nodes and the distributed ledger,
as described in Section IV-C4.
3) DIGITAL SIGNATURES
A widespread approach to prove authenticity of data is the
use of digital signatures and public key cryptography, which
is also applied in DLT. The use of cryptography increases
energy consumption due to more computationally intensive
operations [17]. Several signature algorithms have been pre-
sented that differ, for example, in their space and time com-
plexity, their energy consumption, and the degree of security
for signing data or approving authenticity of signed data.
To find a suitable signature algorithm for the PMS, we evalu-
ated five different signature algorithms for signing data under
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TABLE 3. Comparison of different signature algorithms on an ESP32
micro-controller.
consideration of the following factors: period for signing
data, memory consumption, energy consumption, one-time
signature use, and quantum safety (cf. Table 3). To evaluate
the energy consumption of the digital signature generation on
the used MCU, we used a National Instruments USB-6216
module running at 10 kHz. We measured the voltage draw
from the MCU while performing the signing operation and
excluded the voltage draw of other MCU components such
as the LPWAN chip or LEDs (cf. Figure 2).
The only digital signature schemes that meet the limitation
of LoRa’s payload size (243 B) are the elliptic curve digital
signature algorithm (ECDSA) and the Edwards-curve digital
signature algorithm (EdDSA). The results of the energy con-
sumption evaluation revealed that a shorter signature genera-
tion time is correlated to a lower energy consumption. Thus,
EdDSA is the most fitting algorithm for our purpose.
C. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER AS IoT INTEGRATION
MIDDLEWARE
1) BACKGROUND
Distributed ledgers are (Byzantine) fault-tolerant [63] and
append-only distributed databaseswhose operation is enabled
by DLT [17]. In most distributed ledgers (e.g., Bitcoin or
Ethereum), each DLT node stores and maintains a local copy
of the data stored on the ledger and new data are appended
to the local ledger in the form of transactions. When a DLT
node receives a new transaction, the DLT node first validates
FIGURE 2. Voltage draw during EdDSA signature generation on a sensor
node’s MCU.
the new transaction using digital signatures [43]. If the trans-
action is valid, the DLT node keeps the valid transaction in
memory and forwards the transaction to adjacent DLT nodes
in the network. These DLT nodes also validate and forward
the transaction accordingly. Finally, the validated transactions
are directly appended to the distributed ledger or placed in a
higher-level data structure (referred to as a block), which is
then appended to the distributed ledger. To achieve consis-
tency among the local replications of the ledger kept on the
DLT nodes, distributed ledgers use a consensus mechanism.
Most consensus mechanisms used in DLT are at least crash
fault tolerant (e.g., Kafka or Raft) or even Byzantine fault
tolerant (e.g., Nakamoto consensus). Crash fault tolerance
refers to the ability of a consensus mechanism to achieve
consensus among all validating nodes despite (temporarily)
unavailable nodes, for example, due to network latency, hard-
ware errors, or because a node has left the distributed ledger
network. Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus mechanisms are
crash fault tolerant and can additionally handle malicious
behavior of nodes [63]. For example, when a user transfers
the same digital asset to different recipients at the same
time (referred to as double-spending [64]), Byzantine fault-
tolerant consensus mechanisms manage to agree on storing
one of these transactions. Consensus mechanisms tolerate
crash faults and/or Byzantine failures only to a certain thresh-
old (e.g., 1/3 of malicious nodes [65], [66]). This maximum
is referred to as fault tolerance.
Distributed ledgers also differ regarding their read and
write permissions. There are four types of distributed
ledgers [17]: private-permissionless, private-permissioned,
public-permissionless, and public-permissioned. The terms
public and private refer to read permissions of DLT nodes
in a distributed ledger, which means that nodes must first
be authorized to join the distributed ledger. The terms per-
missioned and permissionless refer to DLT nodes’ permis-
sion to validate transactions and take part in the consensus
mechanism. These permissions are comparable to writing
permissions in conventional databases. DLT nodes that take
part in consensus finding are called validating nodes.
2) SELECTION OF A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
Based on the identified requirements for PMSs (cf. Table 2),
trade-offs between DLT characteristics [17], and DLT
archetypes [17], we selected a suitable distributed ledger for
the proposed PMS. Since the consortium members should be
verified before participation and the requirements for non-
repudiation and transparency, including organizations’ iden-
tities, are particularly high in PMSs, we decided to use a
permissioned distributed ledger in which only verified con-
sortium members are allowed to operate a validating node.
Every consortiummember operating a DLT node should have
access to the stored data. To reduce storage consumption, only
the consortium members store replications of the ledger. The
consortium members enable outsiders to access stored sensor
data via a web application or to set up their own nodes with
read permissions.
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Compared to public-permissionless distributed ledgers,
private-permissioned distributed ledgersmostly offer a higher
degree of flexibility (e.g., maintainability), better perfor-
mance (e.g., fast transaction confirmation and high through-
put), and a high degree of transparency [17]. In permissioned
distributed ledgers, transparency is increased because all
consortium members are known and their real identities are
assigned to public keys using a PKI. Since all transactions in
a distributed ledger are digitally signed, their corresponding
issuer is easy to identify using the consortium members’
public keys. In addition, private distributed ledgers mostly
do not employ a pricing scheme for the execution of smart
contracts (e.g., gas in Ethereum), which can decrease oper-
ational cost (e.g., for the execution of smart contracts) when
using distributed ledgers [17]. Therefore, we decided to use
Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) to implement a blockchain for the
proposed PMS [67] (cf. Section IV-C3).
3) HYPERLEDGER FABRIC
HLF incorporates three software components: clients, peer
nodes, and orderer nodes [67]. Clients form the distributed
ledger’s endpoints that enable transaction issuance and the
interaction with, for example, browser applications. Peer
nodes endorse transactions and maintain replications of the
distributed ledger. Orderer nodes generate new blocks, prop-
agate them through the network of the distributed ledger, and
participate in the consensus mechanism.
To interact with the HLF blockchain, every software com-
ponent (i.e., clients, peer nodes, and orderer nodes) needs
to first acquire a certificate to prove its identity from the
consortiummember’s PKI (referred to as membership service
provider in HLF) [67]. Within the PKI, certification author-
ities issue certificates to these software components based
on their public keys. These certificates allow the verification
of identities and their roles of software components of the
distributed ledger and the PMS. For example, peer nodes use
their private keys to digitally sign transactions. To validate
the digital signature attached to each transaction, the PKI
stores the peer nodes’ public keys to which their identities and
responsible consortium members are assigned. By doing so,
the PKI enables the recognition of identities without revealing
the members’ private key.
HLF (v 1.4.1) offers the choice between three consensus
mechanisms: Solo, Kafka, and Raft. In addition, there is
the custom developed and Byzantine fault-tolerant consen-
sus mechanism BFT-SMaRt applicable to HLF (v 1.3) [68].
To evaluate these consensus mechanisms for HLF regarding
their performance characteristics (i.e., max. throughput and
transaction latency) in changing configurations (i.e., number
of peer nodes and transaction issuance rate; cf. Appendix A
and Figure 3), we performed benchmarking using Hyper-
ledger Caliper [69].
Solo is a centralized consensus mechanism with a sin-
gle orderer node that sends new blocks to all peer nodes.
Although Solo represents the fastest consensus mecha-
nism among the HLF built-in consensus mechanisms [70]
FIGURE 3. Throughput of different consensus mechanisms (i.e., Solo,
Kafka, Raft, and BFT-SMaRt) for varying transaction issuance rates on
Hyperledger Fabric for four orderer and four peer nodes.
(cf. Figure 3 and Appendix A), Solo is not meant to be
used productively because it is neither crash fault tolerant
nor Byzantine fault tolerant [67]. In addition, Solo does not
meet requirements for censorship resistance and comes with
a single point of failure due to its centralized design, directly
impeding availability of the overall PMS. Therefore, Solo is
unsuitable for the PMS.
Kafka is a decentralized consensus mechanism that
includes a cluster of Apache Kafka nodes in addition to the
DLT nodes (i.e., orderer nodes and peer nodes) in HLF [71].
Order nodes retrieve data from Kafka nodes, which the
Apache ZooKeeper nodes keep track of. In the Kafka cluster,
a Kafka node, which is elected as the current cluster leader,
initiates the replication of data among all Kafka nodes in
the cluster. If the cluster leader is no longer available, the
ZooKeeper ensemble elects a new leader [72]. Compared to
other crash fault-tolerant consensus mechanisms (e.g., Paxos
or Raft), Kafka has a significantly higher message complex-
ity, which inhibits scalability regarding a large number of
validating nodes [73]. Scaling the Kafka peer nodes from four
to twelve decreases the transaction throughput from 200 tx/s
to 50 tx/s. This decrease in throughput may form a bottleneck
in the PMS (cf. Appendix A). Although different organi-
zations independently operate the order nodes, one single
organization controls the entire Kafka cluster and ZooKeeper
ensemble [74]. All orderer nodes communicate with the
same, centralized Kafka cluster. Therefore, the requirements
for high availability and censorship resistance for the PMS
(cf. Table 1 are not fulfilled.
Raft is a leader-based consensus mechanism, which has
been widely applied due to its high performance [75]. In Raft,
all orderer nodes are assigned to one of the three roles:
candidate, follower, or leader. Initially, all orderer nodes are
followers. If no leader exists over a certain period, a leader
election is triggered and the followers change their role to
candidate. The candidates vote for a new leader. One of
the candidates becomes the new leader after a majority is
achieved. The leader receives all transactions and forwards
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them to the follower [76]. To keep its leader position, the
leader periodically sends a heartbeat to the follower. When
a follower times out after waiting for a heartbeat from the
leader, the follower elects a new leader [77]. Our measure-
ments reveal that Raft has a higher throughput and shorter
transaction latency compared to Kafka. In addition, Raft has
better scalability than Kafka and an increased number of
Raft peer nodes leads to a lower decrease in throughput
(cf. Appendix A). Raft is crash fault tolerant up to 50% of the
number of orderer nodes in a distributed ledger [78]. Never-
theless, Raft is vulnerable to malicious behavior of assigned
consortium members (Byzantine failures), which may
impede censorship resistance. The unsafe conditions happens
when the current leader crashes and transactions are blocked
in the committing queue until a new leader is chosen [79].
This kind of attack could impede censorship resistance or
even lead to a denial of service. Due to these vulnerabilities,
Raft does not fulfill the requirements for availability, censor-
ship resistance, and reliability for PMSs (cf. Table 1).
BFT-SMaRt executes transactions similar to the practi-
cal Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [65] but comes with
improved reliability and higher scalability regarding the num-
ber of orderer nodes [80]. Similar to PBFT, clients trigger
the execution of the consensus mechanism by sending a
transaction to all orderer nodes. The leader (referred to as
the primary leader) broadcasts a batch of transactions (e.g., a
block), which should be appended to the distributed ledger
and to its followers (referred to as secondary nodes). The
followers reach consensus by voting on whether or not to
append the transaction batch. To have a request success-
fully appended to the distributed ledger, more than two-
thirds of the followers must reply that they appended the new
request to their local replication of the ledger. BFT-SMaRt
achieves a lower throughput and a better scalability than Raft
(cf. Appendix A).
BFT-SMaRt achieves a lower average latency for an issued
transaction to be committed than the other consensus mecha-
nisms (cf. Figure 3). This difference in the average latency is
mainly caused by the way blocks are stored: while blocks in
BFT-SMaRt are stored in the random access memory (RAM),
the other HLF-supported consensus mechanisms store blocks
on the hard drive storage [81].
The security model of BFT-SMaRt requires a total number
of followers n to tolerate f < n3 − 1 fraudulent followers
f [68]. In the case of a fraudulent leader, a majority of the
honest followers can vote on the legitimacy of the current
leader and replace it with the another DLT node after a
predefined period [68]. Nevertheless, the leader may drop
certain requests [82], [83]. Because BFT-SMaRt is Byzantine
fault tolerant and offers sufficient performance for the PMS,
we find BFT-SMaRt best suitable for the PMS among the
evaluated consensus mechanisms.
4) WORKFLOW
The proposed PMS requires each consortium member to
set up their own computer running a client, a certification
authority as part of the PKI, a peer node, an orderer
node, and a publicly accessible API. Each client includes a
Node.js server, which represents the access point for incom-
ing requests (e.g., sensor messages to be processed). More-
over, the Node.js server hosts a certification authority and
stores the public keys and roles of the consortium mem-
bers’ sensor nodes, orderer nodes, and peer nodes. When
consortium members register a sensor node with the PMS,
the certification authority generates a cryptographic key pair
and a unique sensor node ID for the sensor node. The pri-
vate key is stored exclusively on an encrypted storage of
the sensor node. The public keys of all sensor nodes are
assigned to the respective sensor node ID and stored by
the PKI. To establish the communication between sensor
nodes and the distributed ledger, each consortium member
can use an individual LoRa network. Already existing public
LPWANs can be used for wireless data transmission of sensor
messages provided that digitally signed sensor messages are
forwarded from public LPWAN servers to the distributed
ledger.
To measure air pollution, consortium members place mul-
tiple sensor nodes in the environment of interest. Each sensor
node detects its GPS coordinates, the relative humidity, the
temperature, and the particulate matter. Each sensor node’s
MCU reads the data from its sensors and defines a universally
unique identifier (UUID) for each measurement by using a
random number generator with a length of 16 B according
to recommendations of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) [84]. Sensor nodes digitally sign the sensor data and
the UUID to make data authenticity provable. Subsequently,
the sensor node broadcasts a sensor message (including the
sensor data, the measurement UUID, its digital signature of
the sensor data, and its sensor node ID) to all adjacent LoRa
gateways. Next, the sensor nodes switch into a power save
mode before the next measurement is carried out. During the
power save mode, the different sensors and the GPS module
are turned off.
When the LoRa gateways receive a sensor message, the
LoRa gateways broadcast the sensor message to the clients
of the DLT nodes via TCP/IP. Subsequently, each client
invokes a smart contract on the peer nodes to process
the received sensor message. First, the sensor node ID is
extracted from the incoming sensor message to query the
public key of the sensor node from the PKI and to verify
the digital signature. If the sensor node’s public key is not
registered with the PKI, the sent sensor message is rejected
by the smart contract. Otherwise, the transaction is verified
and the sensor node ID, the measurement UUID, and the
sensor data are included into a new block appended the
ledger.
To analyze stored sensor data, the PMS offers a publicly
accessible API that can be integrated into various applica-
tions (e.g., a browser application). Via the API, functions of
the smart contract deployed to the distributed ledger can be
invoked to fetch all stored sensor data from the distributed
ledger.
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V. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED POLLUTION
MONITORING SYSTEM
For the evaluation of the PMS, we assumed a consortium
of four members each operating a validating node. We set
up the PMS in an urban area using five sensor nodes, three
LoRa gateways, four clients, four peer nodes, and four orderer
nodes. The sensors nodes issued new messages every five
minutes, including the sensor nodes’ locations, the current
timestamp, the temperature, the relative humidity, and pollu-
tants (PM10) at different locations. Similar to other field tests
of mobile PMSs [85]–[87], we conducted a 24 h evaluation
of our PMS. In the following, we discuss to which extent the
PMS meets the requirements stated in Section II.
Accuracy. According to a common sensor calibration
method [88], we evaluated the sensor nodes’ accuracy by
comparing our measurements with those from a stationary
reference PMS. Therefore, we colocated a portable sensor
node next to a government-run stationary reference PMS [89],
whichwas equippedwith calibrated air quality sensing instru-
ments [90]. As illustrated in Figure 4, the pollutants (PM10)
recorded by the proposed PMS (solid line) closely align
with the pollution data recorded by the stationary reference
PMS (dash-dotted line) [90]. Compared to other air pollution
monitoring studies [91], [92], our portable PMS achieved a
low mean absolute error (MAE)2 of 1.7 µg/m3 during the
24 h evaluation. We observed the smallest deviations of the
measured pollutants (PM10) during late afternoon rush hour
(3:00-6:00 pm; MAE = 0.2 µg/m3) and a strong change in
the sensor nodes’ accuracy during night (3:00-6:00 am; MAE
= 6.1 µg/m3). The sensor nodes’ measurement accuracy
might be affected by air temperature and relative humidity
changes [93] and can be further improved by applying a
particle distribution–based correction algorithm (e.g., kappa-
Köhler theory [94]) [95]. However, with regard to the low
overall MAE, the PMS satisfies the accuracy requirement.
Availability. During the 24 h evaluation time, no com-
munication errors occurred such as crashed or unreachable
devices. Due to the high level of redundancy regarding the
LoRa gateways and DLT nodes, the PMS reaches higher
availability compared to centralized PMSs that prefer a lean
bandwidth use over redundant sensor message broadcasting.
Hence, we claim that the availability requirement of our PMS
is fulfilled even for long monitoring duration.
Bandwidth. The maximum duty-cycle in LoRa represents
the maximum percentage of time during which a device
(e.g., sensor node) can occupy a channel [96]. The maximum
duty-cycle of the EU 868 ISM band is 1% per channel and
results in a maximum total transmission time (referred to as
air time) of 864 s/d per channel [96]. With the bandwidth
of 250 kHz, spreading factor of nine, code rate of one and
payload size of 121 B per transmission, the air time per trans-
mission of the proposed PMS is approximately 328ms [97].
2Mean absolute error describes the average deviation between two mea-
surements and is defined as the sum of the absolute values of the residual
divided by the total number of measurements.
FIGURE 4. Comparison of PM10 exposure measured by the proposed
PMS (red) and reference measurements by a stationary air quality station
operated by the Bavarian State Office for the Environment (LfU) in
Germany (dot-dashed line) [90]. All measurements were carried out at
the same location in Augsburg (Germany).
According to the measurement interval of 5 min/msg per
sensor node and an evaluation time of 24 h, the total air time
of all five sensor nodes was approximately 472 s/d. Thus, the
PMS fulfills the bandwidth requirement.
Censorship resistance. Since each consortium member
self-operates an individual LoRa network, no third party is
involved (e.g., The Things Network). All consortium mem-
bers can set up and integrate their own gateways into the PMS
network to assure censorship resistance. In addition, broad-
casting sensor messages to all reachable gateways further
increases censorship resistance. With an increasing number
of independently operated DLT nodes, the PMS’s censorship
resistance increases. However, the number of independent
consortium members is limited by the scalability of the BFT-
SMaRt consensus mechanism. Therefore, the proposed PMS
fulfills the requirement for censorship resistance regarding
the network communication and achieves limited censorship
resistance regarding the distributed ledger.
Energy consumption. Our energy consumption measure-
ments reveal that the sensor node’s average energy consump-
tion is 60 mA/h. By disabling the permanently running GPS
module, the total energy consumption of the sensor node
could be reduced to 19 mA/h. Therefore, the GPS module
is only turned ON once a day to synchronize the MCU clock
and to check the sensor nodes location. Without permanent
use of the GPS module, the sensor node would be powered
for approximately 22 d using a battery capacity of 10A h.
We consider the requirement for energy consumption to be
fulfilled.
Independence. The sensor nodes and LoRa gateways are
replaceable by a wide range of other devices (e.g., Raspberry
Pi). The LoRa protocol, the HLF blockchain, and the applied
digital EdDSA signature algorithm are open source software
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and free to use. By using these software frameworks and
protocols and replaceable devices, we avoided dependencies
from proprietary software and hardware. Therefore, the PMS
fulfills the requirement for independence.
Integrity. Data integrity is provable from the time of send-
ing the digital signed messages from the sensor node due
to the use of digital signatures. If the smart contract on
the distributed ledger validates that the sensor message has
not been tampered with during its transmission, the sen-
sor messages are appended to the distributed ledger. Thus,
only if all gateways tamper with the sensor message of the
same measurement are no new sensor messages appended
to the distributed ledger. This scenario is unlikely because
consortium members set up their own LoRa network and
should have no incentive to tamper with their own data on the
gateways. Hence, we find the PMS meets the requirement for
data integrity.
Nonrepudiation. Each sensor node is identifiable and signs
its grasped measurements with its unique private key [98].
Thus, all transactions stored on the distributed ledger can be
unambiguously assigned to a sensor node. The private key
is protected by various security checks of the ESP32 MCU,
which makes it hard to leak the private key. In combination
with the tamper resistance of the distributed ledger, it is
hard to corrupt the PMS regarding nonrepudiation. Since the
recomputation of EdDSA-generated private keys by attackers
is still not feasible [99], the PMS fulfills the requirement for
nonrepudiation.
Portability. All sensor nodes are battery powered and put
into a 13×7×5 cm3 weather-resistant box (cf. Appendix B)
to reduce their environmental impact restrictions. Consortium
members can place registered sensor nodes anywhere without
consideration of particular environmental conditions other
than those specified by the manufacturer. The portability
of the LoRa gateways is limited by their permanent power
consumption of 60W [100] and degree of weather resistance.
However, compared to stationary PMSs, the LoRa gateways
have very low energy consumption and installation effort and
can be easily relocated. Therefore, the PMS meets require-
ments for portability.
Reliability. During the evaluation, no communication
channel faults or outliers in the period between the issuance
of sensor messages and their confirmation on the dis-
tributed ledger were detected. The PMS reliably recorded
all 1,440 measurements, and all duplicate sensor messages
have been filtered as intended. All stored data were pub-
licly accessible using the API hosted by the individual con-
sortium members. In the proposed PMS, a single gateway
failure does not necessarily lead to data loss because sensor
nodes redundantly broadcast their messages to all adjacent
LoRa gateways within reach. BFT-SMaRt tolerates up to
one-third of malicious orderer nodes among the total num-
ber of orderer nodes in the distributed ledger. Since it was
shown that consensus mechanisms with probabilistic finality
(e.g., Nakamoto consensus in Bitcoin) can even be com-
promised by a minority (e.g., 30% of the overall hashing
power [66]), we find the fault tolerance of BFT-SMaRt suf-
ficient for the PMS with a small number of stakeholders
compared to large distributed ledgers such as Bitcoin; more-
over, consensus cannot be influenced by computational power
such as in Bitcoin. Due to the ability of the PMS to deal
with crashed or corrupted gateways and malicious consor-
tium members, we find the PMS fulfills the requirements for
reliability.
Scalability. We evaluated the scalability of the overall PMS
from data collected at the sensor nodes to the storage of the
data on the distributed ledger. We identified the gateways as
a scalability bottleneck in the PMS that arises due to LoRa’s
low duty-cycle and the mesh network topology of sensor
nodes and gateways. Changing the number of gateways has
a stronger effect on the performance of the PMS than does
changing the number of sensor or peer nodes because an
increasing number of gateways also increases the number
of duplicate sensor messages. In our field test, for exam-
ple, five sensor nodes and three gateways generated 15 sen-
sor messages to be processed by the distributed ledger and
slightly decreased the distributed ledger’s confirmation rate3
to 99.40% (cf. Appendix A). The integration of twelve peer
nodes in the PMS using the BFT-SMaRt consensus mech-
anism decreases the throughput from 150 tx/s to 100 tx/s,
which shows better scalability than the alternative consensus
mechanisms (cf. Appendix A). The overall capability of the
PMS to process 100 tx/s would cover up to six different
sensing regions,4 simultaneously sending data to the dis-
tributed ledger. Since the PMS does not require real-time
data (e.g., new measurements of single sensor nodes every
second) and the workload should be processed within the
determined measurement interval of five minutes, we con-
sider the requirement for scalability of the PMS to be fulfilled.
Throughput. During the field test, the proposed PMS did
not show performance bottlenecks. Using the available air
time of 864 s/d for each public LoRa channel, each sen-
sor node can even transmit a maximum of 21 msg/h. Each
dual-channel gateway can process up to two sensor mes-
sages simultaneously [100], which allows for fast processing
of queued sensor messages. Assuming that every gateway
receives all five sensor messages simultaneously, 15 msg/s
are forwarded to the distributed ledger for a single measure-
ment interval. The evaluation of different consensus mecha-
nisms (cf. Section IV-C3 and Appendix A) indicates that the
distributed ledger in the presented PMS can reliably handle
up to 150 tx/s incorporating four peer nodes and four orderer
nodes. With a maximum throughput of 150 tx/s our PMS
can theoretically process a maximum of 450 msg/s.5 Hence,
3Ratio in percentage of issued transactions to max. throughput.
4Equal to our field test, each sensing region is equipped with three
gateways and five sensor nodes.
5We assume that each sensor node transmits amaximumof threemessages
every second based on an air time of (0.328 s) for eachmessage. Note that this
assumption is a theoretical worst-case estimation and often larger measuring
intervals are chosen (e.g., one measurement every 5 min).
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we regard the PMS to have fulfilled the requirements of
throughput.
Transparency. The presented PMS is based upon a private-
permissioned distributed ledger, and stored sensor data are
fully transparent for the consortium members who operate
the distributed ledger. To make stored sensor data publicly
accessible, the consortium members must individually host
an API that allows the public to interact with the distributed
ledger from outside the consortium [101]. The public keys
and addresses of the consortium members are retrievable
via the API and can be mapped to the real identities of the
consortium members. The individual APIs of the consortium
members may be subject to malicious behavior of consortium
members. To decrease the impact of malicious behavior of
individual consortium members, users, which are not part of
the consortium, should request all APIs of all consortium
members and compare the retrieved sensor data for incon-
sistencies. By doing so, corrupted APIs should stand out.
Since we decided to prioritize low resource consumption over
full openness of the PMS, the requirement for transparency
is only partially fulfilled because outsiders cannot directly
access the distributed ledger.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK
Existing research on IoT applications (including PMSs incor-
porating portable, low-energy sensor nodes) has shown a
special interest on achieving an appropriate equilibrium
regarding the trade-off between performance and security
(e.g., [102]–[106]). To find such an equilibrium for PMSs,
various software designs using the LoRa communication
protocol have been proposed (e.g., [30], [103], [107]) that
comprise the design of IoT applications from the sensor node
to the data storage. The integration of battery powered, low-
energy sensor nodes into DLT was considered in LoRaWAN
using digital signatures and public key cryptography [108].
During an initial enrollment process, a certification author-
ity issues certificates to each sensor node of the network.
To verify the identities of the sensor nodes, the nodes send
their certificates to a single network server, which represents
a centralized certification authority. The network server needs
to verify the identity of each sensor node before the net-
work server can issue a transaction to a private distributed
ledger [108]. However, the network server forms a single
point of failure andmight impact the availability of the infras-
tructure. The certification authority in the PMS proposed in
this work is redundant and thus overcomes this challenge and
fulfills the requirements for availability (cf. Section II).
Compared to portable sensor nodes, LoRa gateways are
mostly power socket-operated and thus have sufficient com-
putational resources to be directly integrated as (validating)
nodes in a distributed ledger [30], [107]. The use of stan-
dard LoRa gateways as a light client of a distributed ledger
(e.g., Ethereum Light Client) allows a simple integration of
different sensor nodes into IoT applications. The compatibil-
ity with existing LoRaWAN devices is maintained because no
changes of the LoRa communication protocol are required.
Nevertheless, it is likely that LoRa gateways will become
targets of cyberattacks because they act as a bridge between
IoT devices and the distributed ledger and might not hold
the requirement for censorship resistance (cf. Section II).
In the PMS proposed in this work, LoRa gateways are not
part of the distributed ledger and are only used to forward
digitally signed transactions. Even if a single LoRa gateway
is corrupted (e.g., temporally switched off), sensor messages
can still be transmitted to the distributed ledger because
sensor messages are broadcast simultaneously to multiple
LoRa gateways to avoid a single point of failure and meet
the requirement for censorship resistance.
For secure data transmission from sensor nodes through
LoRa gateways to a distributed ledger, various studies used
LoRaWAN [109], [110]. Concepts of integrating DLT into
LoRaWANhave been developed to achieve secure and decen-
tralized public networks [111]–[113]. Instead of relying on a
LoRaWAN operated by third-party providers, passive roam-
ing techniques were used to create a fully decentralized
LoRaWAN [112]. To enable roaming agreements between
different network and application servers in a decentralized
and open way, smart contracts were used. These smart con-
tracts acted as a domain name service for gateways and ran
on a public-permissionless Ethereum blockchain [112]. The
execution of smart contracts on a public-permissionless dis-
tributed ledger (e.g., Ethereum) is subject to a pricing scheme
that requires users to pay for the smart contract execution in
proportion to the computing resources allocated to the exe-
cution. The execution cost required to execute smart contract
functions (e.g., join-request) is highly dependent on current
demand (market price). The extremely volatile [114] and gen-
erally high prices of popular cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin
or Ether) challenge the cost-efficient design of DLT-based
systems [115]. The PMS proposed in this work does not
require users to pay for the sensor node registration or smart
contract execution and represents a cost-efficient DLT-based
system.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present the design and implementation of
a PMS using portable low-energy sensor nodes, the LoRa
protocol, and an HLF blockchain. The PMS is character-
ized by an energy-efficient and secure end-to-end data trans-
fer between portable sensor nodes and a distributed ledger.
The evaluation shows that the proposed PMS design effec-
tively works and that DLT is applicable to the collection of
environmental data. We showed that DLT can be employed
as a shared, decentralized infrastructure among consortium
members in the field of environment analysis to overcome
the prevalent challenges regarding scarcity and validity of
environmental data and to reduce the inconsistency of the
evidence about air pollution.
During the design process of the PMS, we realized that
HLF (v 1.4.1) only provides crash fault-tolerant consensus
mechanisms (i.e., Solo, Kafka, and Raft), in contrast to our
definition of DLT that requires Byzantine fault tolerance.
Although the need for Byzantine fault tolerance in private
VOLUME 8, 2020 189375
M. Lücking et al.: Merits of a Decentralized PMSs Based on DLT
distributed ledgers is often considered to be of no particular
importance (e.g., [116]–[118]), we present a use case for DLT
that specifically requires fraud resistance through Byzantine
fault tolerance in this paper.
Even though Byzantine fault tolerance should be an inher-
ent characteristic of distributed ledgers [17], we found only
few Byzantine fault tolerant consensus mechanisms applica-
ble to HLF (e.g., BFT-SMaRt [119], [120] or PBFT [65],
[121]). In addition to the security model, we determined that
the implementations of the different consensus mechanisms
strongly differ regarding their performance (cf. Appendix A).
Surprisingly, the Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus mecha-
nism BFT-SMaRt outperformed the HLF-inherent consensus
mechanisms, which is likely due to the different concept
underlying the storage of blocks. Beyond the consensus
mechanism, the HLF architecture is not fully optimized and
currently does not use internal-memory data structures whose
lack of durability guarantees can be compensated by the
blockchain itself [122].
We found that the PMS sufficiently scales up to twelve
validating nodes with a transaction issuance rate of 500 tx/s.
To use the PMS in larger consortia (or in multiple, inter-
connected consortia), sharding [123], [124] or the use of a
public-permissioned distributed ledger (e.g., Steem) should
be considered. The use of a public-permissionless distributed
ledger would increase censorship resistance and transparency
but requires self-implementing identity management, which
is still a prevalent challenge in DLT (e.g., [125], [126]). Nev-
ertheless, benchmarking these different types of distributed
ledgers would reveal insights into the achievement of the
identified requirements. Although the measurement period
of 24 h in the field test reflects commonly used measure-
ment periods of PMSs that incorporate portable sensor nodes
(e.g., [87], [127], [128]), the evaluation is not representative
for long-term use of PMSs.
More research needs to be carried out to investigate the
likelihood for potential attacks and the impact of network
delays on the entire PMS performance. In this context, dif-
ferent broadcasting strategies for sensor messages should be
investigated to find a Pareto optimum between the number
of deployed gateways and sufficient redundancy to achieve
high reliability in sensor message transmission. In addition,
more work needs to be carried out to define the local air pol-
lution probability in order to adjust the measurement interval
of the sensor nodes and to maximize their battery lifetime.
This work points out the particular importance of Byzantine
fault tolerance in DLT, and future research should emphasize
the development of robust Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus
mechanisms applicable to private distributed ledgers. From a
hardware perspective, the investigation of integrated circuits
for digital signatures of low-energy sensors should be of
particular interest in order to decrease energy consumption
and to increase fraud resistance at the sensor node endpoint.
We believe that low-cost accessible sensor networks and
distributed database systems need to evolve together to
increase benefits for their users beyond closed measurement
infrastructures. Our evaluation results indicate that developers
must consider constraints of wireless networks (e.g., available
air time) to successfully integrate battery-powered sensor
nodes into distributed ledgers. We contribute to research and
practice by presenting results of a comprehensive require-
ments analysis of existing PMSs incorporating DLT and
low-energy devices that help to design and assess PMSs.
The detailed evaluation of alternative approaches for net-
work protocols, consensus mechanisms, and digital signature
algorithms helps the development of tamper-resistant and
transparent PMSs and similar IoT applications (e.g., shipping
container tracking and monitoring).
This work follows calls from extant research
(e.g., [129]–[133]) regarding environmental data collection
by increasing stakeholder engagement in the data collection
and serves as a guide to facilitate new participatory research
designs. Our evaluation of different consensus mechanisms,
digital signature schemes, and the proposed design for a
decentralized PMS that includes low-energy sensor nodes
helps to resolve the trade-off between performance and secu-
rity in the IoT field.
FIGURE 5. Portable sensor node composed of a particulate matter (PM10)
sensor (Nova SDS011), a humidity and temperature sensor (Grove
DHT22), a GPS module (Ublox Neo-6M), a microcontroller unit (ESP32),
a rechargeable lithium polymer battery, and an external LoRa antenna.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT CONSENSUS
MECHANISMS IN HYPERLEDGER FABRIC
Performance of different consensus mechanisms applied to
the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain with four peer nodes
for varying transaction issuance rates, different consensus
mechanisms (i.e., Solo, Kafka, Raft, and BFT-SMaRt), and
a varying number of peer nodes (i.e., 4, 8, and 12; except for
the centralized Solo).
See Table 4.
APPENDIX B DESIGNED SENSOR NODE
Wedesigned a portable sensor node composed of a particulate
matter (PM10) sensor (Nova SDS011), a humidity and tem-
perature sensor (Grove DHT22), a GPS module (Ublox Neo-
6M), a microcontroller unit (ESP32), a rechargeable lithium
polymer battery, and an external LoRa antenna.
See Figure 5.
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TABLE 4. Performance of different consensus mechanisms applied to the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain with four peer nodes for varying transaction
issuance rates, different consensus mechanisms, and a varying number of peer nodes.
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